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EXPERTISE IN ACTION: PRESENTING AND ATTACKING EXPERT
EVIDENCE IN DNA "FINGERPRINTING" CASES
MICHAEL LYNCH*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS study examines transcripts and video footage of expert testimony
during criminal trials, pre-trial hearings and appeal cases in the
United States and the United Kingdom. The aim of the study is to identify
recurrent moves and countermoves through which interrogators and ex-
pert witnesses build up and break down credibility. The conditions under
which expert knowledge is secured-or made insecure-are of interest
both for Science & Technology Studies ("S&TS") and legal studies. Re-
search on landmark decisions by the United States Supreme Court on the
admissibility of expert evidence points to the importance of judicial
(mis)conceptions of "science" and the exercise of discretion in pre-trial
admissibility hearings. Less attention has been given to interactional ex-
changes through which interrogators and witnesses present and attack ex-
pert testimony. There is, of course, considerable informal lore on
strategies for presenting and undermining expert evidence, but in the
courtroom, such strategies encounter interactional contingencies such as
adversarial objections, judicial reactions and interventions and witness
compliance or recalcitrance. Drawing upon ethnomethodological and
conversational analytic studies of courtroom interaction, this article dem-
onstrates how the nature, relevance and limits of "expert" identity are
highly malleable and reactive to moves and counter-moves by parties to a
hearing.
The topic of expert evidence, especially expert evidence that claims
scientific status, is one of the major points of convergence between S&TS
and legal studies. As several scholars have elaborated, versions of science
that are invoked and officially recognized in legal settings are out of step
with current thinking in history, philosophy and social studies of science.1
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1. See DAVID CAUDILL & LEWIS H. LARUE, No MAGIC WAND: THE IDEALIZATION
OF SCIENCE IN LAW (2006); Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Representing the Sociology
of Scientific Knowledge and Law, 19 Sci. COMM. 307, 307-27 (1998); Shiela Jasanoff,
(925)
1
Lynch: Expertise in Action: Presenting and Attacking Expert Evidence in
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Although there is no single agreed-upon version of science that would cor-
rect such legal versions, many S&TS scholars would agree that they are
narrowly cast. One major focus of discussion is, of course, the famous list
presented in the Supreme Court's Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals2
ruling. The list is characterized in various ways injustice Blackmun's opin-
ion, as well as in later court rulings and commentaries. In some accounts
it is a list of four-testability, peer review, error rate and general accept-
ance. In others, it is a list of five-testability, peer review, standards, error
rate and general acceptance. It is a list of what is variously called "factors,"
"general observations," "rules," "considerations," "concerns," "flexible
standards," "guidelines" and "criteria." What the list applies to--all expert
evidence, or only evidence claiming grounding in novel scientific princi-
ples or techniques-was open to dispute, but was later resolved, not with-
out further ambiguity, in the Kumho Tire v. CarmichaelP decision.
Moreover, the list itself is presented in a way that denies its essential value
for demarcating science from non-science; it is qualified by repeated warn-
ings that it is not intended to be used as a checklist, and that the specific
"factors" (or whatever they are) are not exclusive or binding on judicial
discretion. And yet, the list is rehashed endlessly and indeed seems to be
used in many admissibility hearings as a checklist for excluding evidence.4
There are clear reasons why the Daubert list holds fascination for
S&TS and legal scholars. For one, it is prominent in federal law, and is
sometimes mentioned in judicial rulings in state courts that have not
adopted it.5 Furthermore, it presents a puzzling picture of science that
can be criticized for being incoherent and outmoded. Additionally, as
noted above, Daubert is a relatively rare instance in which a high court has
made general pronouncements about the nature of science. Such pro-
nouncements may seem ill-informed by current research in philosophy
and social studies of science, 6 but they provide opportunities for academic
criticism and corrective.
What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 32 JURIMETRICSJ. 345, 345-59
(1992).
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
4. See Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Daubert and the Exclusionary Ethos: The
Convergence of Corporate and Judicial Attitudes Towards the Admissibility of Expert Evi-
dence in Tort Litigation, 26J.L. & POL'Y 231, 231-57 (2004).
5. See, e.g., People v. James Hyatt: County of Kings. Indictment no. 8852/2000
(Oct. 10, 2001); see also M. Lynch & S. Cole, Science and Technology Studies on Trial:
Dilemmas of Expertise, 35 Soc. STUD. OF Sci. 269, 292 (2005) (discussing People v.
James Hyatt, 162 A.D.2d 713 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)).
6. See SHIELAJASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAw, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN
AMERICA (Harvard Univ. Press 1995); David Caudill & Richard Redding, Junk Phi-
losophy of Science? The Paradox of Expertise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 685, 685-766 (2000); Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Conjec-
tures and Exhumations: Citations of History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science in U.S.
Federal Courts, 14 L. & LITERATURE 309, 309-66 (2002); Susan Haack, Trial and Error:
The Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science, 95 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH S66, S66-S73 (2005).
926 [Vol. 52: p. 925
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Similar to the creation-evolution trials such as McLean v. Arkansas
Board of Education7 and Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District,8 Daubert pro-
vides a fine opportunity for science studies scholars to locate debates
about the nature of science within a highly consequential practical do-
main. Since S&TS scholars thrive on formulating and criticising defini-
tions of science and demarcation criteria, it becomes possible for
philosophers, historians and sociologists of science to be expert witnesses.
Such opportunity can be a mixed blessing, as we saw in McLean and espe-
cially in Kitzmiller. In McLean, philosopher of biology Michael Ruse ap-
peared as an expert witness for the plaintiffs and furnished Judge Overton
with a list of essential characteristics of science that the judge recited in his
ruling against the defendants. Yet, Ruse was later taken to task by fellow
philosophers of science for having promulgated an outmoded (largely
Popperian) and arguably inapplicable philosophy of science.9 In Kitz-
miller, philosopher Steve Fuller, who calls himself a social epistemologist,
testified for the defendant (the Dover area school board), and attracted
criticism from others in social studies of science for offering skeptical testi-
mony about evolution. Like Ruse, Fuller (though apparently inadver-
tently) provided testimony that was of use for the judge when ruling in
favor of the plaintiffs. Indeed, Judge Jones repeatedly quoted Fuller's tes-
timony in his ruling to support holding in favor of the plaintiffs.' 0
Despite such setbacks, judicial metascience-general conceptions of
science deployed by judges and expressed in judicial rulings such as
Daubert-remains an appealing topic for S&TS research. In this article,
however, rather than focusing on judicial reasoning, I will pursue another
line of research on expert evidence. This line of research takes its point of
departure from an often-repeated argument about the "interpretative flex-
ibility" of rules and related formalisms, such as plans, instructions, algo-
rithms and methodological protocols. Given that such formalisms have a
"flexible" relation to actions produced in accord (or out of accord) with
them, just how they are used in actual settings of conduct becomes a lively
7. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
8. 400 F. Supp.2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
9. See P. Quinn, The Philosopher of Science as Expert Witness, in SCIENCE AND REAL-
rry: RECENT WORK IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 32-53 (J.T. Cushing et al. eds.,
Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1984); L. Laudan, Science at the Bar: Causes for Concern, 7
Sci., TECH. & HuM. VALUES 16, 16-19 (1982); Michael Ruse, Response to the Commen-
tary: ProJudice, 7 Sci., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 19, 19-23 (1982); Michael Ruse, Com-
mentary: The Academic as Expert Witness, 11 Sci., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 68, 68-73
(1986).
10. See Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Anti-social Epistemologies, 36 Soc. STUD.
OF Sci. 843, 843-53 (2006) (discussing Kitzmiller); Steve Fuller, A Step Toward the
Legalization of Science Studies, 36 Soc. STUD. OF SCi. 827, 827-34 (2006) (same); Ke-
vin Lambert, Comments, Expert Metascientists, Fuller's Folly, Kuhnian Paradigms, and
Intelligent Design, 36 Soc. STUD. OF Sci. 835, 835-42 (2006) (same); Michael Lynch,
From Ruse to Farce, 36 Soc. STUD. Or Sci. 819, 819-26 (2006) (same).
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research question.'1 Given the Supreme Court's explicit emphasis on the
"flexible," discretionary use of the Daubert list, it should seem likely that
there is a great deal of slack between the high court's pronouncements
and a given trial court's rulings and allowances. The existence of such
"slack" does not mean that Daubert makes no difference. Instead, it means
that the list of criteria (if that is what they are) does not clearly determine
how the moment-to-moment production and assessment of expert evi-
dence is guided and evaluated in actual courtroom conduct. It also means
that, even when the list is explicitly invoked,just how it relates to a particu-
lar expert's testimony remains to be established in situ. Consequently,
much remains to be investigated about how expert evidence is presented
and evaluated in admissibility hearings and trial courts. This is the topic I
shall address.
In what follows, I present excerpts from transcripts of expert testi-
mony in criminal trials involving forensic evidence and analyze how tech-
nical expertise is presented, attacked and circumscribed in dialogues
among witnesses, lawyers andjudges. Following some preliminary remarks
about the organization of testimony and expert testimony in particular, I
shall present excerpts of testimony that exhibit discursive structures that
are relevant to displaying or undermining expertise. These particular ex-
cerpts are taken from transcripts of trials involving DNA profile evidence.
I shall focus on excerpts from the 1995 O.J. Simpson trial in which defense
attorney Peter Neufeld cross-examined prosecution witness Dr. Robin Cot-
ton, Director of Research at Cellmark Diagnostics. Those excerpts were
selected for analysis not because of the intrinsic importance of the Simp-
son "trial of the century" (which apparently was not nearly as significant
for the law as it was for the popular media), but because of the abundance
of transcript and videotaped testimony of expert witnesses produced
through the broadcast of the trial.
Although Daubert did not have jurisdiction in California courts, and
the dialogue between Neufeld and Cotton occurred in the trial court
rather than in an admissibility hearing, the dialogue concerned procedu-
ral standards-one of the items on the Daubert list. As we shall see,
Neufeld struggled to demonstrate what, if any, standards could be invoked
to assess the scientific adequacy of the prosecution's DNA evidence. This
problem emerged at a level of detail beneath the resolution of the Daubert
list. Following discussion of that problem, we shall examine an instance of
testimony (in this case, testimony by a fingerprint examiner) in which the
Daubert list is explicitly relevant, though in a rather dubious way. In this
11. This line of research (especially its most sceptical formulations, such as in
H.M. Collins's studies) exists in tension, if not outright contradiction, with general
formulations, such as the so-called "periodic table of expertises" recently formu-
lated by Harry Collins & Robert Evans. For Collins's early studies, see H. M. CoL-
LINS, CHANGING ORDER: REPLICATION AND INDUCTION IN SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE (Sage
1985). For the "periodic table," see HARRY COLLINS & ROBERT EvANs, EXPERTISE: A
NEW ANALYSIS (Univ. of Chi. Press, 2007).
[Vol. 52: p. 925928
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case, the Daubert list provides a model for organizing testimony rather than
a set of independent standards for assessing the reliability of a particular
source of expert evidence. The paper concludes by raising questions
about what difference Daubert makes for presenting and evaluating expert
evidence.
II. TESTIMONY
Expert testimony is a specialized instance of courtroom testimony,
which is distinct in certain respects. As famously noted by Justice Learned
Hand in 1901, expert evidence presents jurors with specific problems of
understanding:
The whole object of the expert is to tell the jury, not the facts...
but general truths derived from his general experience. But how can the
juryjudge between two statements each founded upon an experi-
ence confessedly foreign to their own? It is just because they are
incompetent for such a task that the expert is necessary at all...
when the conflict [between experts] is direct and open, the ab-
surdity of our present system is apparent. 12
The learned Justice could have added that judges are not necessarily any
better than jurors when it comes to fathoming expert testimony,1 3 but on
the assumption that judges are capable of protecting jurors from charla-
tans and other purveyors of unreliable but seemingly impressive evidence,
expert witnesses are subjected to admissibility hearings and voir dire exami-
nations prior to being allowed to testify in open court.
In the Anglo-American adversary system, with very few exceptions, ex-
perts are summoned by one or the other litigating party. 14 Forensic ex-
perts in criminal cases usually testify for the prosecution, consistent with
the fact that forensic laboratories work closely with the investigation of
crimes. Defendants can, and sometimes do, commission forensic analyses
and call expert witnesses. In many cases, defendants wishing to commis-
sion such expert evidence must do so with their own resources, as many
state and local courts do not furnish indigent defendants with funding for
it. Expert witnesses are exempted from some of the restrictions on hear-
say testimony that apply to "ordinary fact" witnesses, and are permitted to
elaborate upon relevant knowledge conveyed by teachers and texts during
their training in the specialty. Despite the special status of expert testi-
mony, many of the same general formats of interrogation apply to expert
and non-expert witnesses alike: they are called to the stand and then sub-
jected to direct- and cross-examination. The testimony of an expert wit-
12. Learned Hand, Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REv.
40, 54 (1902).
13. See F. Taroni & Colin Aitken, Probabilistic Reasoning in the Law (pts. 1 & 2),
38 Sci. &JusT. 165, 165-77, 179-88 (1998).
14. Federal Rule of Evidence 706 permits a judge to summon expert wit-
nesses, but judges rarely do so. See FED. R. EvID. 706.
2007] 929
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ness, like that of any other witness, is solicited through a dialogue with the
interrogator, composed of question-answer sequences. Further, many of
the same restrictions apply to asking questions, avoiding leading ques-
tions, responding in a relevant way to the question on the floor and so
forth. In addition, many of the same interrogation strategies for building
up or breaking down credibility apply to expert as well as non-expert
witnesses.
Because an expert, by definition, possesses relevant knowledge that is
not widely accessible, effective cross-examination can require at least some
insight into the normal practices of the expert community. An illuminat-
ing account on this point is given byJ.S. Oteri et al. in a series of brief, but
very instructive, exhibits of the craft of cross-examining government phar-
macologists in drug cases. 15 In a typical case of this sort, the defendant is
alleged to have possessed or attempted to sell a controlled substance such
as marijuana or heroin, and an amount of such substance was seized from
the defendant's person or premises. To prove that the substance in ques-
tion was the illegal drug featured in the criminal charge, a pharmacologist
testifies about various laboratory observations and tests on samples of the
seized substance. In certain respects, the situation is analogous to interro-
gations of forensic scientists who testify about DNA tests on blood or other
bodily materials associated with suspects, victims and crime scenes-in
both instances, laboratory tests are used to ascertain the probable identity
of a substance, in the one case, and of a person, in the other.
Oteri et al. present a series of ideal-typical sequences of questions for
attacking a state pharmacologist's credentials and testimony. 16 These stra-
tegic sequences are designed for deployment before a jury, but variants of
them could very well be produced in an admissibility hearing or voir dire
examination before ajudge. They perform what S&TS scholars sometimes
call "deconstruction"-the unraveling of factual testimony in an effort to
expose the practical and judgmental production of the evidence. This is a
rather mundane conception of the "deconstructionist" arts, which has lit-
tle to do with the legacy of Derrida.17 Indeed, Sir Karl Popper, hardly a
Derridean post-structuralist, can be quoted to nicely summarize what the
clever defense attorney hopes to unravel. 18 In his criticism of the idea that
scientific knowledge can be traced back to discrete sensory observations,
Popper argues that "you would in fact never arrive at all those observations
by eyewitnesses in the existence of which the empiricist believes. You
15. SeeJ.S. Oteri et al., Cross-examination in Drug Cases, in SCIENCE IN CONTEXT:
READINGS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 250-59 (B. Barnes & D. Edge eds., Open
Univ. Press 1982).
16. See id.
17. See Stephan Fuchs & Steven Ward, What is Deconstruction, and Where and
When Does it Take Place? Making Facts in Science, Building Cases in Law, 59 Am. Soc.
REV. 481, 483 (1994) (comparing Jacques Derrida's definition of deconstruction
with more mundane argumentative strategies).
18. See KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIEN-
TIFIC KNOWLEDGE 22 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 2002).
[Vol. 52: p. 925
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would find, rather, that with every single step you take, the need for fur-
ther steps increases in snowball-like fashion."19 For the attorney cross-ex-
amining a state-employed pharmacologist's report that the substance
seized by the police during a search of the defendant's vehicle's glove
compartment was heroin, the aim is to unravel a simple finding so that, in
"snowball-like fashion," it devolves into a complex array of previously un-
mentioned but questionable material transfers, judgments of similarity
and difference and decisions about when enough testing had been done.
And, while the expert is not an "eyewitness," the alert attorney demands
accounts of what the expert witness observed, first hand, about the sub-
stance and its origins, as opposed to what the expert took for granted or
accepted from the word of others (including the police). Note, however,
that the questioner must know something about the pharmacologist's craft.
This is especially clear in the following sequence:
Q: Is it true that other materials have different wavelengths than
heroin?
Q: Is it possible for a material containing several materials with
dissimilar wavelengths to collectively have the same peaks as
heroin?
Q: Is it true that other materials have the same wavelengths as
heroin?
Q: Is it true that some materials interfere with the analysis of
heroin?20
Even without knowing anything about tests for heroin, we should be able
to forecast the witness's "Yes" answers to each question. To ask such ques-
tions, and to anticipate such answers, the questioner must have some tech-
nical knowledge of the substance and tests. Moreover, as the parenthetical
commentaries in the sequence below indicate, the "deconstruction" of the
expert's testimony relies upon normative knowledge of what such an ex-
pert would do in a typical case like the one at hand, given the standard
practices and constraints of the job:
Q: Did you do a quantitative test on the substance? (Few do.)
Q: So you don't know what percentage, if any, of the substance is
heroin? (The exact percentage can be determined. It rarely ex-
ceeds twenty percent.)
Q: What other substances were present? (Chemists rarely test
for other substances.) 2 1
19. See id.; see also Steven Shapin, Cordelia's Love: Credibility and the Social Studies
of Science, 3 PERSP. ON Sci. 255, 255-75 (1995).
20. See Oteri et al., supra note 15, at 257.
21. See id. at 254-55.
20071
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In this choreographed sequence, the initial question anticipates the wit-
ness's answer, and the next question builds off of that answer, and so on
down the line. In effect, the sequence of questions is a template for build-
ing an argument. 22 The witness is set up as a docile partner whose steps
are predetermined by the interrogator's moves. Further sequences
presented by Oteri et al. illustrate how a cross-examiner can make effective
use of knowledge of a pharmacologist's typical training and practice, the
educational and professional credentials that a state pharmacologist is
likely to possess, the routine tests that are typically performed and the pos-
sible tests that are not performed, the limits of resolution for the tests that
are done and who else besides laboratory staff is likely to have taken part
in the "chain of possession" of the substance after it was seized from the
defendant and before it reached the laboratory. In other words, the attor-
ney relies upon a partisan and selective sociology of occupations in order
to solicit acknowledgements from the practitioner that the tests performed
were less than exhaustive, that other possible analyses cannot be ruled out
and that the practitioner's scientific credentials are limited. Such ques-
tioning strategies can be highly effective for "exposing" discrepancies be-
tween an initial, unqualified characterization of the test results and the
elicited acknowledgments of uncertainty, equivocality and limited compe-
tence. The upshot of such interrogation can be misleading because it
presumes that routine forensic tests can be perfectly complete, certain and
exhaustive, but the questioning is effective to the extent that it solicits ex-
pressions of uncertainty and acknowledgments of methodological limita-
tions that appear to weaken the credibility of the state's evidence.
III. THE INTERROGATOR'S REGRESS
Unfortunately for interrogators, witnesses have resources of their own
and are not necessarily docile partners who comply with efforts to under-
mine their evidence. 23 Moreover, an interrogator's knowledge of an ex-
pert witness's technical routines is likely to be spotty at best. Though it is
often said that interrogators should only ask questions for which they al-
ready know the answers, there is no avoiding the contingencies of dia-
logue. Asking a question, even a yes-no question, gives the floor to an
interlocutor who can then produce variants of "Yes, but.. or "Yes, and
." answers, which can be difficult to cut off without seeming to badger
the witness or stifle the ability of the expert to give an adequate explana-
tion, especially when the witness comes across as a credible member of an
22. See Augustine Brannigan & Michael Lynch, On Bearing False Witness: Per-
jury and Credibility as Interactional Accomplishments, 16 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOCRAPHY
115, 11546 (1987) (discussing how arguments are developed in cross-examina-
tion); see also MICHAEL LYNCH, & DAVID BOGEN, SPECTACLE OF HISTORY (Duke Univ.
Press 1996).
23. See A. W. McHoul, Why There are No Guarantees for Interrogators, 11 J.
PRAGMATICS 455, 455-71 (1987); see also LYNCH & BOGEN, supra note 22.
932 [Vol. 52: p. 925
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honored profession. 2 4 Moreover, given the interrogator's incomplete
knowledge of the expert witness's practices, and of the specific circum-
stances under which those practices were exercised in that particular case,
"explaining" an answer may allow the witness to head off the trajectory of a
question sequence and to introduce unanticipated facts and arguments.
The interrogator is then faced with maintaining argumentative authority
in the dialogue, but without the comfort of a choreographed sequence of
questions.
The following sequences from People v. Simpson 25 illustrate some of
the contingencies of courtroom dialogue. The sequences occurred during
a several-day-long cross-examination of a key prosecution witness, Dr.
Robin Cotton of Cellmark Diagnostics, who during direct testimony had
instructed the jury on the DNA profile methods used to analyze many of
the blood samples collected during the investigation.
2 6
Cotton also presented a series of DNA profile matches between Simp-
son's blood and some stains found at the crime scene, and between the
two murder victims' blood samples and stains found in Simpson's vehicle
and on items of clothing he apparently wore on the day of the murder.
The defense contested the evidence on many fronts, but one of its more
consistent lines of attack was to suggest that the Los Angles Police Depart-
ment (LAPD) and Cellmark mishandled the crime scene evidence, al-
lowing the original DNA to degrade. Then, according to the argument,
amounts of blood from Simpson's reference sample (samples collected di-
rectly from him for purposes of comparison with the crime scene evi-
dence) got into the degraded criminal samples either through a
deliberate effort to frame Simpson by corrupt and racist police officers, or
through inadvertent errors by Cellmark staff. Accordingly, the apparent
matches between Simpson's profile and the profiles developed from crimi-
nal samples attributed to the perpetrator were actually matches between
the portions of the same reference sample.2 7 To demonstrate incompe-
24. To come across as a credible member of an honored profession is itself a
performative accomplishment, through advanced degrees and a record of accom-
plishment in an established academic science confers clear advantages. These re-
marks borrow liberally from ethnomethodological and conversation-analytical
studies on the social production of concerted talk. See generallyJ. MAXWELL ATKIN-
SON & PAUL DREW, ORDER IN COURT: THE ORGANISATION OF VERBAL INTERACTION IN
JUDICIAL SETrINGS (Macmillan 1979); HAROLD GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN
ETHNOMETHODOLOGY (Prentice Hall 1967); A. M. Pomerantz, Descriptions in Legal
Settings, in TALK AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 226-43 (G. Button & J.R.E. Lee eds.,
1987); H. SACKS, LECTURES ON CONVERSATION (Blackwell 1992).
25. See People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Ca. Super. Ct. 1995).
26. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Examination of Robin Cotton,
People v. Simpson, 1995 WL 289345 (May 12, 1995); Transcript of Oral Argument,
Examination of Robin Cotton, People v. Simpson, 1995 WL 289346 (May 12,
1995).
27. William Thompson asserts that this argument was not as outlandish as it
may have seemed to some viewers and commentators. One key item of evidence
was a sock found in Simpson's bedroom during the police investigation. Thomp-
son states that a bloodstain on the sock, which matched Simpson's DNA profile,
2007] 933
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tent handling of evidence, at least by the police, and possibly also by
Cellmark, Neufeld deployed an, interrogative strategy that, first, solicits the
witness's assent to relevant practical standards, and second, explores the
extent to which specific practices deployed in the case at hand adhered to
those standards. The transparent aim of the strategy is to expose discrep-
ancies between authoritative standards and particular practices used in the
case at hand. A schematic outline of the strategy is as follows:
1. Propose a technical rule or standard that should be followed.
2. Find an authoritative statement of the standard (in a manual,
for example).
3. Elicit agreement from the witness that the standard should
have been in force.
4. Elicit agreement from the witness that the practice in question
departed from the standard.
5. Argue or insinuate that this departure amounts to an error or
lapse.
Over the course of his cross-examination Neufeld struggled, and com-
plained about having to struggle, to solicit the witness's acknowledgement
that there was a single authoritative standard in force. Even when a stan-
dard was acknowledged, the witness was non-committal about how much
discretion various agents should be granted, and how much license a given
agent could claim for bypassing particular rules or recommendations.
Part of Neufeld's difficulty had to do with the fact, acknowledged by Bruce
Matheson, an LAPD laboratory administrator, that the police had not yet
developed a manual for handling and analyzing DNA evidence. 28 Specific
standards were not fully codified, though Matheson asserted that the
LAPD used informal standards:
Blasier (Defense): Is it your opinion that not having a manual for
your field unit is an acceptable practice, scientifically acceptable?
Goldberg (Prosecutor): Vague, argumentative.
Ito (The Court): Overruled.
Matheson (LAPD laboratory administrator): I think it is prefera-
ble that we have a manual; however, I believe you can still do
good work and provide training and have people do acceptable
work out there without having one.29
showed traces of a chemical used by forensic labs for preserving blood samples.
Moreover, according to Thompson, the stain bled through the sock to the other
side, indicating that it had been deposited on the sock while it was lying on a flat
surface rather than when it was being worn by Simpson. See William C. Thompson,
DNA Evidence in the O.j Simpson Trial, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 827, 829 (1996).
28. Transcript of Oral Argument, Testimony of Gregory Matheson, People v.
Simpson, 1995 WL 257176 (May 3, 1995).
29. Id.
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Note that the interrogator (Defense Counsel Robert Blasier) suggests that
the very lack of a manual may itself be a violation of "scientifically accept-
able" procedure. Matheson's reply suggests instead that a manual would
be "preferable," but by no means essential, for doing "acceptable work."
Dr. Robin Cotton represented Cellmark, not the LAPD, and she was
loath to comment on the LAPD's procedures. Yet, by Neufeld's lights she
also was less than forthcoming about the general standards to which
Cellmark adhered. During one line of questions, Neufeld attempted to, in
his words, "impeach the witness with a learned treatise"-in this case, a
report published in 1992 by the National Research Council of the Na-
tional Academy of Science entitled DNA Technology and Forensic Science.
30
Neufeld established the authority of this text by proffering a copy, and
noting that Cotton carried her own copy:
Neufeld: I noticed yesterday, Doctor Cotton that you had your
own copy of the National Academy of Sciences book DNA Tech-
nology and Forensic Science, is that right?
Cotton: Yes, I do.
Neufeld: Are you familiar with, ahm, some of the members who
are on that committee that authored this book?
Cotton: Yes.3 1
He went on to ask Cotton if she was familiar with the chairman (Victor
McKusick) and many of the other prominent members of the committee
that authored the report, laboriously reciting their credentials and asking
Cotton to acknowledge the authority of their opinions. Cotton often qual-
ified her assent to such questions, such as in the following sequence in
which Neufeld refers to McKusick:
Neufeld: And I take it that he is someone whose opinions you
respect?
Cotton: I guess that would depend on his opinion about any par-
ticular issue. . . . Despite the fact that he is a very well-known
scientist, he may have an opinion on a single issue that I might
not agree with, and an opinion on another issue that I might, so I
can't make a blanket statement that I would agree with every
opinion that Dr. McKusick would have.3 2
Throughout the three days of his cross-examination of Cotton, Neufeld
repeatedly tried to solicit Cotton's assent to the authority of the NRC Re-
port, but she consistently qualified her assent. For example, on the first
30. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (Nat'l
Acad. Press 1992).
31. Transcript of Oral Argument, Testimony of Robin Cotton, People v. Simp-
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day of her cross-examination, Neufeld asked, referring to Chapter Two of
the NRC Report (which is about "Technical Considerations"):
Neufeld: . . . are there some things in the chapter that you do
agree with?
Cotton: That would apply to the whole book. There are things
that I agree with and there are things that I don't agree with.
33
Neufeld also had difficulty soliciting unequivocal agreement to specific
recommendations in the text, such as in the following sequence, where he
cites chapter and verse:
Neufeld: Dr. Cotton, in arriving at your opinions on this particu-
lar matter, did you read the section of the NRC Report entitled
'Experimental (sic.) Foundation'?3 4
[Pause, approx. two seconds.]
Cotton: Ahm, if I could just look quickly at that.
Neufeld: Page fifty-five in your- in your book.
[Long pause.]
Neufeld:... In arriving at your opinions as to- what a laboratory
should do as a precondition before using new DNA typing, did
you at all rely on that section of the National Academy of Sci-
ence's book DNA Technology in Forensic Science?
Cotton: No.
35
In contrast to the ideal-typical examples presented by Oteri et al., these
sequences reveal how a witness is able to resist the seemingly inexorable
movement from question to question, requiring the interrogator to con-
tend with equivocal answers or flat denials, in contrast to the clear confir-
mation that would allow him to proceed to the next question. Moreover,
in this instance, the witness only partly complies with the effort to set up
an authoritative normative standard.
At the start of the third day of his cross-examination of Cotton, and
before the jury was admitted into the courtroom, Neufeld complained
about the witness's replies to his questions about the NRC report:
Neufeld: In particular, with regard to the National Academy of
Science's book report DNA Technology in Forensic Science.
What happened on Thursday and Friday, your Honor, is that the
33. Transcript of Oral Argument, Examination of Robin Cotton, People v.
Simpson, 1995 WL 289345 (May 12, 1995).
34. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 30, at 55. Note that the section
is titled "experiential foundation," not "experimental foundation." See id.
35. Transcript of Oral Argument, Examination of Robin Cotton, People v.
Simpson, 1995 WL 289345 (May 12, 1995).
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witness, who obviously is extremely familiar with this book, has
read it very carefully, in fact carries her own copy in her brief-
case, was not allowed to be impeached by saying that those por-
tions of the book she doesn't agree with, she doesn't rely upon. I
think if we allow that approach to continue?
The Court: Do you have any case authority that the court's rul-
ings on this were inappropriate?
Neufeld: I haven't seen any case that stands for the proposition
that a witness can selectively pick and choose which sections of a
learned treatise solely to enable her to say that for every section
that I disagree with, I don't rely on it so you can't bring it to my
attention. It would stand the entire rule on its head. That's
what's so remarkable and I don't think that should be allowed to
continue and I've never seen any case anywhere that allows a wit-
ness to draw those kinds of distinctions between page 365, I agree
with but page 366 I don't, and so forth and so on. Obviously she
is only going to then rely on those sections she agrees with, so
one could never ever use a learned treatise to impeach a witness.
The Court: Mr. Clarke, any comment?
Clarke: I think Mr. Neufeld mischaracterizes what the witness has
done. She has relied on only portions of that material because
those portions are scientifically appropriate and other portions
are inappropriate, so I think to characterize it as selective reli-
ance to make testimony sound better is absolutely absurd in the
context of this witness's testimony. The court asked Mr. Neufeld,
do you have any authority to demonstrate why the court's rulings
are incorrect and Mr. Neufeld says I don't know of any rulings to
the contrary. This court has previously ruled on this matter a
number of times and I think the court's rulings are absolutely
appropriate because otherwise the court would be allowing inad-
missible hearsay to come into court.
Neufeld: Your Honor, the only point I have on that very briefly is
it's per her opinion that certain portions are inappropriate, but
those portions she requires as inappropriate were written by the
same people who she felt wrote other portions that were appro-
priate. The only point I'm trying to make is I can't believe that
it's an appropriate attitude within the scientific community to
simply reject out of hand which is what the rule requires so far,
reject out of hand those statements, those recommendations writ-
ten by people in a book, in a learned treatise in the same book in
which you agree with other portions of it, so those statements can
20071
13
Lynch: Expertise in Action: Presenting and Attacking Expert Evidence in
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW
come in. It's setting up some kind of artificial construct which I
think completely deludes (sic.) the entire principle.36
The complaint points to what we can call "the interrogator's re-
gress."3 7 Unless Neufeld can get Cotton's unambiguous consent to the
scientific authority of the NRC Report, he cannot use its technical recom-
mendations as stable normative standards for assessing the "scientific ade-
quacy" of Cellmark's or the LAPD's practices. This is because Cotton's
uneven subscription to the authority of that "learned treatise" allows her
to argue that specific departures from its recommendations are not viola-
tions or lapses, but are instead alternative practices governed by local stan-
dards and/or tacit knowledge. Neufeld complains that Cotton's testimony
is inconsistent and evasive, but she can (and does) claim an alternative
source of authority and rationality. Far from acknowledging lapses, she
simply disavows the over-arching authority of the NRC recommendations,
while implying that the local standards and experience-based judgments
in her laboratory are adequate for the task at hand. Her credentials as a
Ph.D. scientist and laboratory director enhance her ability to claim more
discretion than, say, a low-level criminalist such as Dennis Fung or Andrea
Mazzola (two witnesses in the Simpson case who came off comparatively
poorly during cross-examination).
The failure to get unequivocal consent to the standards provided by
the "learned treatise" does not stop Neufeld in his tracks, however. Al-
though the NRC report was an especially prominent source of standards
from which to leverage testimony, Neufeld also used the emergent testi-
mony itself as a local resource for "bootstrapping" standards into place.
The recursive sequencing of questions and answers enabled him to enlist
the witness in a local build-up of agreements, so that earlier agreements
furnished a basis for leveraging later testimony. For example, during the
third day of the cross-examination, Neufeld solicits Cotton's subscription
to "the practices of other laboratories" as a standard for the mundane
practice of collecting crime scene evidence and placing it in a "bindle"-a
36. Transcript of Oral Argument, People v. Simpson (May 15, 1995) available
at http://www.cnn.com/US/OJ/trial/may/index.html.
37. This notion is parasitic on H.M. Collins's notion of "experimenter's re-
gress" (discussing COLLINS, CHANGING ORDER, supra note 11, at 83-84) an idea that
itself is parasitic on skeptical philosophical arguments about the role of observa-
tion in experimentation. The experimenter's regress has to do with the relation-
ship between experimental results and the competent performance of the
procedures that produce the results. When an experiment is novel, and its results
are uncertain and/or contested, an experimenter cannot use the expected result
to assess the competence of the procedure and the adequacy of the instrumenta-
tion. Moreover, since many of the contingencies that can affect the result are evi-
dent only in retrospect, if at all, the experimenter cannot be sure that the
experiment was done correctly, independent of the result, and so the investigation
can be bound up in a vicious circle between a questionable result and the constan-
cies of the experiment's performance.
[Vol. 52: p. 925
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folded piece of paper used as a container. Once again, however, he gets a
circumscribed answer:
Neufeld: In your laboratory, Doctor Cotton, is there a standard
procedure that every employee who removes or puts something
into a bindle puts his or her initials on the bindle.
Cotton: Yes.
Neufeld: And are you familiar with the practices in other labora-
tories, Doctor Cotton?
[Brief pause]
Cotton: Eh, not particularly.
Neufeld: Well, Doctor Cotton, to the extent that you have exper-
tise in this area, would you agree that it is a standard procedure
at every forensic science laboratory to have an individual who ei-
ther removes or puts something into a bindle to initial that
bindle?
Cotton: I can really only speak for what we do in our laboratory,
and when we take something in or out. A bindle is taped and
initials are put on-across the tape and the uh-adjacent paper.3 8
In this sequence, Neufeld evidently tries to develop a line of prelimi-
nary questions. Those of us who recall the Simpson trial, and even many
who do not, can anticipate that Neufeld is beginning to frame a discrep-
ancy between a normative standard and what investigators may have done
in the particular case (viz., mislabelling or failing to label a bindle contain-
ing blood evidence collected at the crime scene). Cotton's answers-or,
rather, her replies-to Neufeld's questions only partly comply with the
choreography: while she agrees that the practice of initialling a bindle is
standard for her laboratory, she withholds agreement to questions about
what is standard for other laboratories.
The interrogator's regress is not an endless and vicious cycle, because
the interrogator can-as Neufeld does-call the court's attention to the
witness's (non)responses, and suggest that they are instances of evasion.
In addition, as we can see from the following excerpt, an alert interrogator
can convert a circumscribed reply, in which an expert disavows responsi-
bility for what other agents may have done, into testimony against those
agents. The excerpt also contains a humorous interlude in which Judge
Ito catches a malapropism in one of Neufeld's questions, which Neufeld
acknowledges was inscribed in the notes he was reading-thus indicating
that he had been working through a pre-set sequence of questions.
Neufeld: Would you agree Doctor Cotton, that moisture pro-
motes bacterial growth?
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Cotton: Yes.
Neufeld: And would you agree Doctor Cotton that the bacteria
starts eating up the DNA, and then the DNA deteriorates and
degrades?
Cotton: Over time, yes.
Neufeld: And would you agree, Doctor Cotton, that degradation
occurs more quickly under the combined effects of moisture and
heat?
Cotton: Yes, I would.
Neufeld: In your laboratory, Doctor Cotton, where you are the
laboratory director, would it be scientifically acceptable to let wet
plastic stains remain in sealed plastic bags in-
Judge Ito: . . . You said 'wet plastic stains.'
Neufeld: Sorry. [Pause.] Because that is what I have written here.
[Cotton and audience laugh.]
Neufeld: At least I can read correctly, your Honor. I just can't
write correctly, I'm sorry.
Judge Ito: Here. Let me do it.
Neufeld: Sir- ahm, Doctor Cotton. [Pause.] In your laboratory,
would it be scientifically acceptable to let swatches of wet blood
stains remain in sealed plastic bags in the rear of a parked truck
un-refrigerated and un-air-conditioned in the middle of June for




Cotton: I don't think that would be myfirst choice, but please keep
in mind that my laboratory doesn't collect evidence and so, we
don't collect it, we don't have a truck, we just receive it from some-
one else who has already collected it.
Neufeld: And as a result of that, Doctor Cotton, there is no way
that you can control for the extent to which the- um, offering
agency either degraded those samples or cross contaminated
those samples; isn't that right?
Cotton: Of course.
3 9
This sequence is notable for at least two reasons. First, the humorous in-
terlude touched off by Neufeld's malapropism exposes that he was reading
39. Transcript of Oral Argument, Examination of Robin Cotton, People v.
Simpson, 1995 WL 289345 (May 12, 1995) (emphasis added).
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from a prepared text when he interrogated Cotton. In other words, he
was working through steps in an argument prepared in advance, while
contending with the contingencies of an actual dialogue. The repeated
preface "would you agree that" for successive questions in the early part of
the excerpt provides a way for the cross-examiner to comply with the insti-
tutional demand to ask questions, while at the same time they enable him
to put forward statements for the witness to confirm. The assertions are
designed for agreement-that is, they are formed as unproblematic state-
ments of fact that a reasonable witness should confirm. They also link each
assertion to the just prior assertion, thereby building up an argument with
the witness's complicity. Neufeld's argument follows a line of an attack on
the chain of evidence (sometimes called the "chain of custody") similar to
what Oteri et al. outline for drug cases. Second, toward the end of the
excerpt, Neufeld follows a circumscribed reply with a question that enrolls
the prosecution witness (Cotton) in a criticism that threatens to under-
mine the value of the DNA evidence that Cotton and other prosecution
witnesses had presented to the court.
At the start of the excerpt, Neufeld sets out an argument for casting
doubt upon biological samples handled in a particular way (namely, left in
sealed plastic bags for seven hours in a very hot place). Instead of using a
procedural rule from an authoritative text, Neufeld initially invites Cotton
to agree with a biological proposition about moisture and bacterial
growth. After she assents, he follows by inviting her to agree with further
statements of how that fact may implicate the quality of DNA samples.
After she assents, with some slight qualification, he then begins to formu-
late a question that is more specific to the circumstances of the case,
clearly alluding to samples that were given to Cellmark by the LAPD and
pursuing the defense's junk-in, junk-out argument.
After the humorous interlude about the malapropism, Neufeld re-
sumes with a rhetorical question that elaborately forecasts the answer and
draws an objection for being "argumentative." The objection is overruled,
but Cotton does not give the straightforward answer anticipated by the
question. Instead, she qualifies her agreement ("I don't think that would
be my first choice"), allowing for the possibility that the evidence would be
salvageable, and she pointedly excuses her lab (Cellmark) from responsi-
bility for collecting evidence. Neufeld follows her utterance with a collab-
orative completion4' that turns her lab's lack of responsibility for bad
practice into a lack of control over the evidentiary import of the labora-
tory's analysis. Neufeld thus enlists Cotton's confirmation of an argument
that excuses her domain of expertise from responsibility, while casting
doubt upon the expert evidence she presented. Neufeld then builds upon
her response to appropriate it as testimony against the adequacy of the
LAPD's practice.
40. G.H. Lerner, Notes on Overlap Management in Conversation: The Case of
Delayed Completion, 53 W. J. SPEECH COMM. 167-77 (1989).
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Rhetorically and interactionally, Neufeld attempts to cast doubt upon
the credibility of the evidence that Cotton had presented for the prosecu-
tion. He does so by enlisting Cotton's credibility as a scientist (the phrase
"would it be scientifically acceptable" explicitly invites a "scientific" evalua-
tion of the practice in question). The hypothetical instance that Neufeld
presents-leaving wet stains in a hot vehicle-is a transparent reference to
testimony presented earlier in the trial that describes how blood evidence
collected from the crime scene had been left in a police van for several
hours. It also happens to be a well-chosen example of a "technical" matter
(bacterial contamination of DNA in a sample) that is transparently (if mis-
leadingly) intelligible by analogy with everyday examples of organic mater-
ials that spoil quickly when left in a warm place.
Cotton is at the end of the chain of agents responsible for collecting,
analyzing and presenting the evidence. As director of research in the firm
hired by the prosecution, she is at the "high" end of the hierarchy of scien-
tific authority and credentials. The "low" end is occupied by ground-level
police employees (such as hapless criminalists Fung and Mazzola) who col-
lected crime scene evidence with "swatches" (cotton-tipped swabs), placed
them in containers and transported them to LAPD facilities, from which
they were later moved to Cellmark's laboratories. As Simpson's lawyers
made clear, the low-end employees lacked scientific credentials, and when
cross-examined, they typically professed little understanding of the invisi-
ble constituents of the evidence they handled. 4 1 The defense held that
their actions wittingly or unwittingly degraded, or otherwise ruined, the
scientific (and legal) value of the evidence. Forensic laboratories also in-
clude many low-end agents with limited credentials. However, the stark
difference between the grubby work of collecting samples and the high-
end delivery of expert evidence in the form of graphic displays and statisti-
cal probabilities provides an especially ripe resource for adversary attack.42
41. One of the more humorous episodes during the Simpson trial occurred
when a police officer was interrogated about footprints left at the crime scene. He
was asked if he had taken evidence of the footprints at the scene, and after he
answered affirmatively, he was caught flatfooted (so to speak) by a question about
whether he had collected evidence of "invisible" footprints. When the police of-
ficer professed not to comprehend the question, the interrogator informed him
that it was possible to dust the scene to reveal footprints that were not otherwise
visible. The display of a difference between surface visibility and visibility revealed
through technical mediation is one of the prime ways of exposing the difference
between experts and non-experts.
42. Although high-end scientists sometimes complain of the rough treatment
they get in adversary hearings, they also are addressed in more deferential ways. See
Leslie Roberts, Science in Court: A Culture Clash, 257 Sci. 732, 732-36 (1992) (ad-
dressing complaints of witnesses in an admissibility hearing). There is a possible
echo in the contemporary courts of an early-modern theme that Steven Shapin
describes: truthfulness was strongly identified with the culture of the seventeenth
century gentleman (with Robert Boyle as the iconic example), and the credibility
of the gentleman was associated with his elevated status as someone with little to
gain from deception and much to lose from being caught in a lie. Women, ser-
vants and other low-born categories of folk were deemed untrustworthy because of
[Vol. 52: p. 925
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Following the jury's not-guilty verdict in the Simpson case, one common
explanation of how thejury could have discounted the seemingly powerful
DNA evidence (which, according to the prosecution's results, showed
matches between both victims' DNA profiles and blood evidence collected
from Simpson's Ford Bronco and from a bloody glove found outside his
home, and between Simpson's profile and blood droplets extracted from
the sidewalk at the crime scene and from the Bronco), was that the jurors
agreed with the defense's 'junk-in, junk-out" argument that the DNA
matches had doubtful significance due to incompetent and possibly fraud-
ulent police handling of evidential items prior to their analysis. 43 Without
discounting the charge of incompetence, we should keep in mind that it
was not simply a matter of fact, but was an attribution derived and drama-
tized through interrogative strategies and lawyerly arguments. The de-
fense was able to take advantage of a conjunction of factors that we can
liken to a perfect storm: the location of the courtroom,44 the predomi-
nantly African-American makeup of the jury and the collective memory
(especially among Los Angeles's African-Americans) of the Rodney King
police trial. 45 Police employees are "low" in the chain of custody, and thus
are more readily attacked than credentialed experts, because they lack sci-
the favors they could gain through deception and ingratiation. See Shapin, supra
note 19, at 255-75; STEVEN SHAPIN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TRUTH (Univ. of Chi. Press
1994). A related logic, though distributed across the biography of the individual
rather than across social categories, is discussed in Goffman's account of the "mor-
tification" and "demoralization" that occurs as an inmate is demoted in a carceral
institution to the point of having nothing left to lose from disruptive behavior. See
ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS
AND OTHER INMATES (Anchor 1961).
43. Sheila Jasanoff, The Eye of Eveiyman: Witnessing DNA in the Simpson Trial,
28/5-6 Soc. STUD. OF Sci. 713, 718 (1998); see also Thompson, supra note 27, at 827-
57.
44. Former District Attorney Vince Bugliosi observes that the trial was origi-
nally scheduled to take place in Santa Monica, a predominantly white, well-to-do
community in West Los Angeles, but was moved to a court near the city-center (to
the extent Los Angeles has a center) in order to accommodate the television crews
and cameras. The local neighborhood from which the jurors were drawn was
predominantly African-American. VINCENT BUGLIOSI, OUTRAGE: THE FIVE REASONS
O.J. SIMPSON GOT AWAY WITH MURDER (W.W. Norton 1996).
45. The 1991-92 criminal trial of several white police officers, who were shown
on videotape delivering a series of blows with 'batons' (police clubs) to Rodney
King (an African-American man arrested after a lengthy car chase), resulted in a
not guilty verdict which triggered a massive riot in South-Central Los Angeles. The
trial was held in Simi Valley, a predominantly white and conservative district.
Charles Goodwin gives an interesting account of the use of "expert" evidence by
the defense in the case that resulted in re-specifying the details on the video from
being (apparent) excessive blows meted out to the prone suspect to becoming
technically appropriate responses to incipient aggressive actions by a potentially
dangerous suspect. Although the composition of the jury was often mentioned in
popular accounts, Goodwin does not consider the contingent relation between the
terms and credibility of the rival "analyses" of the video and the pre-judicial incli-
nations of the jury members. See Charles Goodwin, Professional Vision, 96 AM. AN-
THROPOLOGIsT 606, 606-33 (1994).
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entific training and make no claim to understanding relevant molecular
biological principles. Yet, police employees are implicated in the techni-
cal results delivered by the laboratory. 46 Moreover, in the Simpson case,
they were vulnerable to suspicions of racist motivation. Although Neufeld
and the other lawyers also attacked the objectivity of Cotton and others
who represented the high scientific end of the chain, such efforts to un-
dermine the probative value of the DNA evidence proved far more effec-
tive when leveled against the ground-level agents who collected and
handled the evidence.
As noted earlier, California courts do not recognize the Daubert list-
admissibility of expert evidence is guided by a variant of the Frye general
acceptance standard-and there was no admissibility hearing on the ex-
pert evidence in California v. Simpson.4 7 Nevertheless, the above excerpts
from the Simpson trial point to the indeterminate salience of one of the
key items in the Daubert list: standards. By indeterminate salience I mean
that the topic of "standards" was relevant to the solicitation and evaluation
of the expert testimony; just what, if any, version of standards would be
dispositive remained to be seen. Neufeld's questions invoked authorita-
tive scientific standards as a resource for leveraging testimony about the
extent to which such standards were violated or adhered to, but the wit-
ness's replies refused to acknowledge that her laboratory's practices were
uniformly governed by the particular standards Neufeld referenced. Con-
sequently, much of the interrogation was preoccupied with a search for
some kind of standard (whether written in an authoritative text or available
as a common practice in the relevant field) through which to hold the
expert evidence accountable. In the following section, I shall examine tes-
timony in an admissibility hearing in which the Daubert list is explicitly
relevant. Once again, we shall encounter an indeterminate relationship
between formal standards and testimony about practices, only in this case
there is no ambiguity about which standards apply. Instead, the contested
issue is what counts as compliance with specific items on the Daubert list.
46. It is commonplace in the social sciences to impute "unconscious" knowl-
edge to agents; that is, knowledge relevant to the agents' activities but about which
the agent has nothing to say. Using a similar logic, interrogations of "low end"
agents use contrasts with "high end" expert accounts to drive a wedge between the
agent's account of the relevant actions and a "scientific" account of factors that
bear upon the rationality and effectiveness of the action, but about which the
agent seems unaware. In such cases, what is "unconscious" is not located in the
hidden recesses of the mind or body (motives that are not acknowledged, knowl-
edge that is tacit, and so forth); what might be called the biological unconscious is a
hidden rationality or source of agency (e.g., a tendency to spoil or become contam-
inated if handled in a particular way) about which the agent simply does not know.
47. After the trial had begun, the defense filed a motion for an admissibility
hearing on the prosecution's DNA evidence, but it was never held. See Michael
Lynch, The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The O.J. Simpson "Dream Team" and
the Sociology of Knowledge Machine, 28/5-6 Soc. STUD. OF Sci. 829, 829-68 (1998)
(analyzing defense motion).
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IV. THE DAUBERT LIST AS DEMAND CHARACTERISTICS
"Demand characteristics" are a well-known hazard in experimental re-
search with human (and sometimes animal) subjects: the subject picks up
clues from the experimental setting and behaves in a way that complies
with, or otherwise reacts to, the anticipated results of the experiment. In
other words, rather than orienting to the experimental conditions naively,
as a way of revealing naturally occurring behavioral tendencies, subjects
treat the experiment as a test of their competence and try to meet the
demand for a correct answer. Efforts to mask demand characteristics in-
clude misleading subjects about the aims of an experiment, a strategy that
is problematic on ethical grounds.
Here, I use the term to point to a relationship between expert testi-
mony and the Daubert list. For an expert or body of experts, the list articu-
lates a set of instructions for how to appear reliable; 48 it is not simply a list
of independent factors that enable ajudge to assess whether a practice is
reliable. For an expert witness, the items on the list provide demands for
what such a witness will need to say or demonstrate in order for their evi-
dence to meet the test of admissibility. To explore this construal of the
Daubert list, I will examine the testimony of a prosecution witness, Stephen
Meagher, Chief of Latent Fingerprint Unit III, FBI Laboratory, in the case
Colorado v. Hood.49 Meagher has testified in numerous other cases, and a
set of his Powerpoint slides for meeting the Daubert challenge are available
on a website. 50 Starting in 1999, the admissibility of latent fingerprint evi-
dence has undergone dozens of challenges in federal and state courts in
the United States. 5 1 Although fingerprinting was well-established as crimi-
nal evidence early in the twentieth century, and in fact was so well-estab-
lished that DNA "fingerprinting" borrowed its name and credibility when
first introduced in the mid-1980s, it underwent challenge for two principal
reasons in the late 1990s. First, by then, DNA profiling had displaced it as
a gold standard in criminal forensics. Second, the Daubert and Kumho Tire
decisions put a premium on "scientific" characteristics such as probability
estimates and quantitative reliability tests. Fingerprint examiners declare
48. The idea that principles such as the items on the Daubert list can be read
as instructions for situated actions derives from Harold Garfinkel's ethnomethodo-
logical writings. See, e.g., HAROLD GARFINKEL, ETHNOMETHODOLOGY'S PROGRAM:
WORKING OUT DURKHEIM'S APHORiSM, 197-218 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
2002) (providing account of instructed actions).
49. No. 02CA2606, 2004 WL 2903782 (Colo. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2004).
50. Stephen Meagher, Unit Chief, Latent Print Unit II, FBI Laboratory, An
Update on Daubert Hearings on Fingerprints, Address Before IAI 87th Interna-
tional Education Conference, Las Vegas, NV (August 4-10, 2002), available at
http://onin.com/fp/iai_daubert_2002.ppt.
51. An appeal of United States v. Mitchell was the first of these cases. 199 F.
Supp.2d 262 (E.D. Pa. 2002), affJd, United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir.
2004). The most publicized was United States v. Llera-Plaza, which resulted in two
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matches in court without giving specific random match probability mea-
sures, and they rarely have advanced degrees in a science.
52
The FBI and other organizations of latent fingerprint experts reacted
to the Daubert challenges by proposing reliability studies, promoting stan-
dard practices, and upgrading examiners' credentials, but in the short
term, Meagher and other experts endeavored to demonstrate that latent
fingerprint examination already complied with the Daubert standards. This
was a low-cost strategy, compared with the massive effort it would take to
develop random match probabilities (even if it were possible to do so), to
implement systematic proficiency tests and uniform standards for all ex-
aminers and to upgrade existing automatic fingerprint examining systems.
Meagher's testimony in Hood is especially interesting for how it re-
specifies the items on the Daubert list in a way that is compatible with what
fingerprint examiners already do. He relies upon a particular model
adopted by the FBI, which presents fingerprinting as a "scientific proce-
dure" given the acronym ACE-V:
Analysis - the qualitative and quantitative assessment of Level 1, 2
and 3 details to determine their proportion, interrelationship
and value to individualize. 53
Comparison - to examine the attributes observed during analysis
in order to determine agreement or discrepancies between two
friction ridge impressions.
Evaluation - the cyclical procedure of comparison between two
friction ridge impressions to effect a decision, i.e., made by the
same friction skin, not made by the same friction skin, or insuffi-
cient detail to form a conclusive decision.
Verification - an independent analysis, comparison and evalua-
tion by a second qualified examiner of the friction ridge
impressions.
This parsing of the routine procedure into nominal phases presents the
practice in the form of a step-by-step protocol. Moreover, the terminology
(especially "verification") is well-chosen for assuring courts about the relia-
bility of the practice. Recalling that the Daubert list (in at least in one of its
common versions) consists of: (1) testability; (2) known error rate; (3)
peer review; and (4) general acceptance, we can begin to examine how
52. See S.A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND
CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (Harvard Univ. Press 2001);Jennifer L. Mnookin, Finger-
print Evidence in the Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 13 (2001); M.J. Saks &
J.J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 Sci. 892,
892-95 (2005).
53. The three levels refer to: (1) overall holistic pattern of ridge characteris-
tics; (2) detailed ridge characteristics such as whorls, bifurcations, and so forth;
and (3) microscopic details such as the arrangement of skin pores along a particu-
lar ridge.
[Vol. 52: p. 925
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Meagher respecifies those items to be compatible with his model of finger-
print examination.
(1) Testability
The Daubert court associates testability with reliability and validity.
The Supreme Court did not draw sharp conceptual distinctions on the
matter, and Susan Haack points out that the Court's references to the phi-
losophy of science conflate different criteria of testability. Yet, there is
little doubt that the Court was oriented to some conception of experimen-
tal testing.5 4 When Meagher is asked about reliability, he cites quite a
different conception of testing: "100 years of observation":
Q. So is it reliable?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there any test performed to test the reliability of this
method?
A. Uh, well, as just basically definition to science its observation.
I think first the most obvious answer that we have is 100-years of
observation, bench work. In terms of the millions and millions of
comparisons that have been affected, yeah, I will openly admit
there has been practitioner error.
Meagher's account of testing as cumulative experience in the community
of examiners would be highly unlikely to ward off concerns about confir-
mation bias, but apparently it has frequently succeeded in court. Note
that Meagher freely admits the existence of errors, but he then advances a
definition of "known error rate" that enables a "zero" figure to be used as
a probability measure.
(2) Known Error Rate
When asked to discuss "known error rate," Meagher stated:
The methodology has an error rate of zero where practitioner
error rate is whatever practitioner rates are for that individual or
group of individuals. Because fingerprints are unique and they
are permanent there can only be one source attributed to an im-
pression that's left so there have-there can only be one conclu-
sion. It's ident[ification] or non-ident. If error occurs, it's a
practitioner error failing to apply the methodology properly.
Same as a mathematician to the field of math.
Meagher's distinction between practitioner error and error-free meth-
odology draws on an analogy with mathematics. A child's mistaken calcu-
lation, "2+2=3," does not reveal an error rate for elementary arithmetic
(although one could use such a rate to measure how often children of a
54. See Haack, supra note 6.
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certain age make such errors). However, the analogy confuses a tautologi-
cal deduction, "2+2=4," with an empirical determination that two materi-
ally different traces (a latent print or mark, and inked or scanned
exemplar taken under controlled conditions) contain sufficient matching
detail to support a declaration of identity. Determining that a latent print
matches a rolled print is more like determining that two footprints derive
from the same shoe, or that a bite mark on a body comes from the set of
teeth from which a dentist took an impression. The credibility of a re-
ported match depends upon the reliability of the technique, in general,
and the quality of the evidence, in particular.
(3&4) Peer Review and General Acceptance
In the following sequence, Meagher manages to re-specify the mean-
ing of peer review to accord with the verification step of ACE-V, and he
also defines general acceptance in a way that limits to relevant scientific
community to the "profession of forensic fingerprint examiners."
Q. [I]s this methodology generally accepted within the world of
[sic] scientific community?
A. Yes, it is. Absolutely.
Q. And is there a peer review process to this methodology?
A. Well, the peer review to the-to the methodology would be
the verification step but the methodology has in principle been
peer reviewed and been practiced-well, I know since the day I
was trained because I was trained to use this methodology. So
the answer to the question is yes in both general sense as well as
technical sense.
Meagher's version of peer review applies those words in a meaningful
but rather unconventional way. Instead of referring to the conventions for
reviewing publication submissions or grant proposals, "peer review" be-
comes a matter of one fingerprint examiner checking the work of an-
other. And, given the fact that the scientific standing of the community of
practitioners is the very matter in question, to say that there is "general
acceptance" among members of that community does little to settle the
question.
Despite the dubious quality of Meagher's arguments, none of the
Daubert challenges to date has convinced federal or state courts to deny
the admissibility of fingerprint evidence. Thus far, there has only been
one partial exception-the first ruling in Llera-Plaza. In his ruling, Judge
Pollak questioned fingerprint examiners' standing as a "scientific
community":
Even those who stand at the top of the fingerprint identification
field-people like David Ashbaugh and Stephen Meagher-tend
to be skilled professionals who have learned their craft on the job
948 [Vol. 52: p. 925
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and without any concomitant advanced academic training. It
would thus be a misnomer to call fingerprint examiners a "scien-
tific community" in the Daubert sense.5 5
He also objected to the "zero error rate" argument and many of Mea-
gher's and other government witnesses' arguments. Although he did not
rule against the admissibility of fingerprint evidence, he used the ACE-V
schema as a basis for determining that latent fingerprint examiners should
be permitted to present their analyses of the evidence and their detailed
comparisons (the "A" and "C" phases), but not to state their "evaluations"
("E") by declaring whether the latent print "matches" the suspect evi-
dence. His first ruling restricted fingerprint examiners to presenting the
evidentiary basis of their opinions, but did not permit them to declare
explicitly that the evidence "matched." The FBI and other proponents of
the examiner community strongly objected to the ruling and presented
Judge Pollak with numerous documents and testimonies supporting their
objections. Slightly more than two months later, in March 2003, Judge
Pollak took the unusual step of reviewing and modifying his earlier ruling.
The major change he made was to remove the restriction on match decla-
rations. In his concluding statement, he explicitly mentioned Meagher:
Through the efforts of government counsel, Stephen Meagher,
heretofore a name in a transcript, became a real person, and
through his live testimony I was able to get a substantially more
rounded picture of the procedure-the FBI's ACE-V process of
fingerprint identification-whose degree of reliability for expert
evidentiary purposes it is my responsibility to determine. 56
He added that he also learned that Scotland Yard had recently abandoned
its sixteen-point system in favor of one that was substantially similar to the
FBI's ACE-V procedure. Arguing that what is good enough for England
should be good enough for the United States, Judge Pollak acknowledged,
"I have changed my mind."5 7
Although a different case was the occasion for Judge Pollak's two rul-
ings, he based his judgments on a review of the admissibility hearing in
Mitchell. In 2004, Mitchell again came up for appeal. While allowing for
the possibility that expert witnesses who were not themselves fingerprint
examiners could be allowed to testify about the general reliability of the
practice, the court invoked the Kumho Tire decision and ruled that the key
consideration was the reliability of latent fingerprint examination regard-
less of whether it was deemed scientific. And, like Judge Pollak, the Mitch-
55. United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp.2d 492, 563-64 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
[hereinafter "Llera Plaza f'].
56. United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp.2d 549, 563-64 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
[hereinafter "Llera Plaza If'].
57. Id. at 58; see also Simon Cole, Jackson Pollock, Judge Pollak, and the Dilemma of
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ell court accepted Meagher's elaboration of the ACE-V schema as
assurance that the practice was reliable.
If we hold that the Daubert list was originally formulated with scientific
evidence in mind, and that the Kumho Tire decision made clear that the list
extends to all forms of expert evidence, then fingerprint examiners have
benefited from a flexible interpretation of a set of standards that, on their
face, present an inflexible picture of expert evidence. So, for example,
acceptance of Meagher's remarkably flexible conception of "peer review"
completely removes it from the domain of academic publication, and it
becomes a routine work practice. Similarly, acceptance of Meagher's
treatments of error rate and testability for the most part consecrates the
traditional practice of fingerprint examination by association with quanti-
tative evaluation and experimental methodology. Consider in this light a
remark made by Christophe Champod and Ian Evett about the increased
scrutiny that traditional comparison evidence was beginning to undergo in
light of emergent scientific standards:
With the extensive use of DNA-probability based-evidence
and the evolving requirements for the admissibility of scientific
evidence, older identification fields like fingerprints are becom-
ing subject to more rigorous scrutiny and under the pressure of a
growing demand of scientific data to underpin the identification
of fingerprints. 58
The recent Daubert challenges to fingerprinting are clear examples of
such scrutiny, and the model of DNA evidence together with the Daubert
and Kumho Tire decisions clearly provide conditions for such scrutiny.59
Presumably, proponents of fingerprint evidence are now faced with the
task of upgrading their craft to meet such exacting scientific standards,
and such efforts are no doubt underway. The Mitchell and Llera-Plaza II
rulings, however, indicate an alternative way to rhetorically upgrade finger-
print evidence by redefining the Daubert list to be more compatible with
what fingerprint examiners already were doing. Recall that Judge Pollak
remarked in his first ruling that it would be "a misnomer to call finger-
print examiners a 'scientific community' in the Daubert sense." In light of
his and the Mitchell court's subsequent rulings, "the Daubert sense" now has
been expanded to allow expert "communities" and their practices to be
admissible regardless of whether they can claim to be scientific.
The flexible uses of the Daubert list by Meagher and other proponents
of fingerprint evidence, and the acceptance of such uses by federal courts,
may leave us wondering what difference Daubert and Kumho Tire make. Do
58. Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to Fingerprint
Evidence, FINGERPRINT WHORLD 95, 100 (2001).
59. Champod and Evett worked for the British Forensic Science Service, but
their apparent reference to United States Supreme Court decisions about the ad-
missibility of expert evidence indicates that those decisions were notable for foren-
sic scientists abroad.
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they simply provide rationales for courts to make local judgments for or
against admissibility? If so, trend data showing that federal courts have
been less likely to admit plaintiffs' evidence in toxic torts may be less a
consequence of Daubert and more a consequence of the appointment of
judges with pro-business tendencies. 60 And, given the latitude for judicial
discretion and the fact that pro-business judges also tend to express strong
law-and-order commitments, one should not be surprised if the trend to-
ward more restrictive gatekeeping against plaintiffs' evidence in civil suits
runs alongside a trend toward less restricted gatekeeping against prosecu-
tion evidence in criminal trials.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in its Daubert ruling explicitly stated that trial
judges should use testibility, error rate, standards, peer review and general
acceptance as "flexible guidelines" for assessing the admissibility of expert
evidence. As we have seen, flexibility was indeed paramount in the ex-
cerpts from trials and admissibility hearings discussed in this paper-per-
haps more so than the Supreme Court had in mind. In the first set of
excerpts, Peter Neufeld attempted to set up particular "scientific stan-
dards" with which to expose discrepancies between those standards and
specific practices for handling samples and analyzing evidence in the case
at hand. The witness, Robin Cotton, frustrated Neufeld's strategy by em-
phasizing the necessity to make judgments about which standards applied
and how to apply them in particular practical situations. In the second set
of excerpts, the witness, Stephen Meagher, explicitly referenced the
Daubert list, but redefined its features in a way that enabled him to say that
fingerprinting evidence complied with its standards of reliability.
On rare occasions, the courts turn to science studies in a search for
demarcation criteria, such as when they review the constitutionality of leg-
islation promoting "creation science" or "intelligent design" as alternative
scientific theories. Similarly, when making admissibility decisions about
expert evidence, courts have had good pragmatic and legal reasons for
wanting a principled set of demarcation criteria. The problem with this
quest for demarcation criteria is that there is limited support in contempo-
rary science studies for any particular set of such criteria, or even for the
demarcationist project as a whole. Currently, there is far more support, at
least in the circles in which I travel, for conceptions of the disunity of
science, the "interpretive flexibility" of methodological and epistemologi-
cal standards and the indeterminate relationship between theory and ob-
servational evidence.6 1 Explicit pronouncements about science in judicial
rulings and in much of the legal literature evince far more respect for a
picture of science as an institution with distinctive epistemological criteria
60. Cf. Edmond & Mercer, supra note 4.
61. THE DISUNITY OF SCIENCE: BOUNDARIES, CONTEXTS, AND POWER (P. Galison
& D. Stump, eds., Stanford Univ. Press 1996).
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that produces unassailable evidence than one ever finds in contemporary
history, philosophy and social studies of science. One could conclude
from this discrepancy that science studies are dominated by "postmodern"
relativism. However, a less obvious conclusion should at least be enter-
tained: when courts engage in practical demarcation ("boundary work" as
it is often called in science studies), 62 witnesses, lawyers and judges also
become practical relativists. This particular species of relativism is not a
denial of the possibility of knowing anything at all. Instead, it is a matter
of downgrading demarcation criteria and technical standards so that they
become rhetorical themes with which to claim credibility. This is not nec-
essarily a terrible thing.
62. T.F. Gieryn, Bounday-work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science, 48
Am. Soc. REv. 781, 781-95 (1983).
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